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Recent Decisions
BANKRUPTCY - DEBTOR'S EXERCISE OF THE CRAM DOwN OPTION
VALUATION STANDARD FOR COLLATERAL IN CHAPTER 13 - The Supreme
Court of the United States held that section 506(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code directs the application of the replacement value
standard to collateral when a Chapter 13 debtor exercises the cram
down option of section 1325(a)(5)(B) in its rehabilitation plan by
retaining and using the collateral over the secured creditor's
objection.
Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 117 S. Ct. 1879 (1997).
In order to purchase a $73,700.00 tractor truck for use in his
freight hauling business, Elray Rash made a downpayment and
pledged the truck to the seller as security for the remaining
balance.1 Associates Commercial Corp. ("Creditor") obtained the
lien on the truck through assignment from the seller.2 Three years
later, Elray and Jean Rash ("Debtors") filed bankruptcy under
Chapter 13.3 At the time of filing, the Debtors owed the Creditor
1. Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 117 S. Ct. 1879, 1882 (1997).
2. Associates Commercial, 117 S. Ct. at 1882.
3. Id. Only a debtor who is an individual with regular income may be eligible for
Chapter 13 bankruptcy. A Chapter 13 debtor who filed before April 1, 1998 must have
unsecured debt of $250,000.00 or less and secured debt of $750,000.00 or less. MATTHEW
BENDEM COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1.03[6] (Lawrence . King ed., 15th ed. 1997). For cases
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$41,171.00 on the truck loan.4
Pursuant to the cram down provision, section 1325(a)(5)(B) of
the Bankruptcy Code, 5 the Debtors provided in their Chapter 13
bankruptcy plan for retaining the truck for business use and paying
the Creditor the present value of the truck over the life of the
plan.6 The Creditor opposed the Debtor's plan and motioned for
relief from the automatic stay so that it could pursue its state law
remedies.
7
filed after April 1, 1998, the debt limits have been adjusted upwards by the Judicial
Conference of the United States which limits unsecured debt to $269,250.00 and secured debt
to $807,750.00. 10 BANKI. L REP. 224 (1998). The purpose of a Chapter 13 bankruptcy is
rehabilitation not liquidation, thus the debtor may keep its assets and fund its Chapter 13
plan with any subsequent income earned. Id. In a Chapter 13 plan, the secured creditor must
receive the "present value of its secured claim," while an unsecured creditor must, at a
minimum, receive what it would have received in a Chapter 7 liquidation case. BENDER,
supra, at 1-50. Chapter 13 plans are typically funded over a three to five year period. Id. at
1325.08[4][a]. If the debtor successfully completes the plan, the debtor receives a discharge
of personal liability on all dischargeable debts. Id. at 1300.01. The overall policy of a
Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan is to ensure a "fresh start" for the debtor by encouraging
repayment plans instead of liquidation. Id. at 1300.02.
4. Associates Commercial, 117 S. Ct. at 1882. The Creditor held a secured claim on
the truck, but only for the value of the truck. Id. The Bankruptcy Reform Act states that a
lien on property is a secured claim:
to the extent of the value of such creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such
property,... and is an unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such creditor's
interest . . . is less than the amount of such allowed claim. Such value shall be
determined in light of the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or
use of such property, and in conjunction with any hearing on such disposition or use
or on a plan affecting creditor's interest.
11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1994).
5. Section 1325(a)(5) provides three alternative ways to bind secured creditors by
modification of their rights. BENDER, supra note 3, at 1325.06[1][c]. Specifically, section
1325(a)(5)(B) authorizes the debtor to retain the property despite the creditor's objection. Id.
at 1325.06[3]. However, in such a case, the debtor's plan must provide for payment of the
present value of the secured claim over the life of the plan. Id. This provision is referred to
as a "cram down" because it allows the debtor to modify the undersecured creditor's rights
by paying only the value of the collateral, thereby cramming the plan down the creditor's
throat. Id.
6. Associates Commercial, 117 S. Ct. at 1883. The Debtors purported that their truck
was worth $28,500.00. Id.
7. Id. The Debtors took exception to the Creditor's proof of claim reflecting a secured
amount of $41,171.00. Id. Interested in repossessing the truck, the Creditor sought relief from
the automatic stay. Id. Upon the debtor's filing of the bankruptcy petition, the stay
automatically begins. WnjLiu L NORTON JR, NORTON ON BANKRuPrCY LAw AND PRACTICE § 118.1
(2d ed. 1993). The automatic stay prevents collection of pre-petition debts and enforcement
of claims against estate property or the debtor's pre-petition property Id. If relief from the
stay is not granted, it continues until the case is closed or discharge is granted. Id. at
§ 118.2. Thus, in the instant case, the Creditor requested relief from the automatic stay so
that it could pursue its state law remedy of foreclosure. Associates Commercial, 117 S. Ct. at
1883.
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A determination of the collateral's value was made in a hearing
before the Bankruptcy Court.8 The court approved the Debtors'
plan and held that the truck was valued at its foreclosure value of
$31,875.00.9 On appeal, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Texas affirmed the Bankruptcy Court's decision,
but the district court was reversed by a panel of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.10 The Fifth Circuit, on a
rehearing en banc, rejected its earlier ruling and affirmed the
district court, holding that section 506(a) requires the Creditor's
secured claim to be measured by the foreclosure value." The Fifth
Circuit supported its holding by noting that the replacement value
is incompatible with the Creditor's pre-petition secured status
under state law that is based upon the truck's foreclosure value.
12
The court reasoned that application of the replacement value
standard would, in many cases, afford the undersecured creditor
more than what it would be entitled to receive upon the exercise of
its state law foreclosure right.
13
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to
resolve the split among the circuits regarding the proper valuation
standard to apply to collateral retained by a Chapter 13 debtor over
the secured creditor's objection.' 4 Three different standards have
8. Associates Commercial, 117 S. Ct. at 1883. The Creditor asserted that the value of
the truck should be based on its replacement value, which the Creditor defined as the
amount the Debtors would have to pay for a like vehicle. Id. The Debtors believed that the
standard should be the foreclosure value. Id. Determining the truck's value is particularly
important because section 506(a) bifurcates an undersecured creditor's claim into its secured
and unsecured portions and measures the secured component according to the truck's value.
Id. at 1884. Bifurcating the claim is significant because, in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy, secured
creditors are paid in full, whereas unsecured creditors only must receive at least what they
would receive in a Chapter 7 liquidation. BENDER, supra note 3, 1.03.
9. Associates Commercial, 117 S. Ct. at 1883. See In re Rash, 149 B.R. 430, 434
(Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1993) (holding that because the value of the collateral must be valued from
the creditor's standpoint, the secured component of the claim is measured by the truck's
foreclosure value).
10. Associates Commercial, 117 S. Ct. at 1883. Appeals from the bankruptcy court are
reviewed de novo by the district court. BENDER, supra note 3, at 3.03[3][a]. If the district
court's decision is appealed, it is heard by an appellate court, and ultimately, the Supreme
Court of the United States. Id. See In re Rash, 31 F.3d 325, 329-31 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding
that the replacement value is the proper measure of the collateral's value, because if the
foreclosure value were used, it would not give full effect to the language of section 506(a),
and the secured creditor would not be fully compensated for the value of the collateral).
11. Associates Commercial, 117 S. Ct. at 1883. See In re Rash, 90 E3d 1036 (5th Cir.
1996), rev'd by Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 117 S. Ct. 1879 (1997).
12. Associates Commercial, 117 S. Ct. at 1883. See Rash, 90 F3d at 104142.
13. Associates Commercial, 117 S. Ct. at 1883.
14. Id. at 1884.
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been employed by the district and circuit courts: the foreclosure
value, the replacement value,15 and the midpoint value.16 The
Supreme Court disagreed with the Fifth Circuit's interpretation that
the first sentence of section 506(a) requires a foreclosure value
standard. Specifically, the Court determined that the first sentence
of section 506(a), which refers to "the creditor's interest in the
estate's interest in such property," is devoid of reference to any
method of valuation.18 Rather, the Supreme Court found that the
first sentence of section 506(a) plainly states that the creditor's
interest has two parts: a secured part that is measured by the value
of the collateral, and an unsecured part that is measured as the
amount by which the creditor's claim exceeds the collateral's
value. 9 The first sentence of section 506(a) merely allows the court
to bifurcate a creditor's claim into secured and unsecured portions;
it does not mandate one valuation standard over another.
20
Further, the Supreme Court held that the Fifth Circuit erred in
its interpretation of section 506(a) because reading a foreclosure
value standard, or any other standard, into the first sentence
reduces the second sentence to mere surplusage.21 In the second
sentence of section 506(a), Congress instructs that collateral value
is measured according to its "disposition or use."22 Therefore, the
Court reasoned, the creditor's secured status is measured with
respect to the debtor's decision either to retain or to surrender the
collateral.3 If the debtor surrenders the property to the creditor,
15. Id. at 1883. The Supreme Court noted that the replacement value of the secured
claim under section 506(a) is "the price a willing buyer in the debtor's trade, business, or
situation would pay to obtain like property from a willing seller." Id. at 1884. See In re Taffi,
96 E3d 1190, 1191-92 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc); In re Winthrop Old Farm Nurseries, Inc., 50
F3d 72, 74-75 (lst Cir. 1995); In re Trimble, 50 E3d 530, 531-32 (8th Cir. 1995).
16. Associates Commercial, 117 S. Ct. at 1884. See In re Hoskins, 102 F.3d 311, 316
(7th Cir. 1996), overruled by Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 117 S. Ct. 1879 (1997)
(holding that the value of a-vehicle retained by the debtor in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy
proceeding is measured by the average of the retail and wholesale values of the collateral);
In re Valenti, 105 F.3d 55, 62 (2nd Cir. 1997), overruled by Associates Commercial Corp. v.
Rash, 117 S. Ct. 1879 (1997) (amrming the district court's holding that a vehicle in a Chapter
13 bankruptcy proceeding is valued by averaging its retail and wholesale values).
17. Associates Commercial, 117 S. Ct. at 1884.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1884-85.
21. Id. at 1885. The second sentence of 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) states that "value shall be
determined in light of the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of
such property."
22. Associates Commercial, 117 S. Ct. at 1885. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).
23. Associates Commercial, 117 S. Ct. at 1885. Bankruptcy Reform Act, 11 U.S.C.
§ 1325(a)(5) (1994) provides that a plan will be confirmed by the court if:
Vol. 36:455
Associates Commercial v. Rash
the creditor may pursue its state law remedies and sell the
property at a foreclosure sale.24 But if the foreclosure value is used
to determine the secured status when the debtor retains the
property and makes payments through the Chapter 13 plan, no
distinction exists from the creditor's perspective between -surrender
and retention.2 5 By exercising the cram down option, the debtor
benefits from continued use of the collateral and avoids
foreclosure. 26 The Supreme Court, therefore, held that in such a
case the replacement value standard must be used to protect the
creditor who incurs the risks of receiving neither the property nor
its value, and to draw a meaningful distinction between the two
"dispositions" or "uses" under section 1325(a)(5) from which the
debtor must choose.
2 7
The Supreme Court also addressed the Fifth Circuit's perception
that application of the replacement value standard derogates from
state law, which limits the creditor's recovery to the collateral's
foreclosure value.28 The Court noted that federal bankruptcy law
displaces state law and authorizes modification of creditors' state
law rights by valuing collateral based upon its disposition and use.29
The Supreme Court stated that since the federal law cram down
option overrides conflicting state law foreclosure rights and adjusts
creditors' rights, valuation based on "disposition or use" should be
equally unobjectionable.
30
Finally, the Supreme Court rejected the midpoint valuation
standard that splits the difference between the foreclosure and
replacement value standards. 31 The Court concluded that, to
(5) with respect to each allowed secured claim provided for by the plan -
(A) the holder of such claim has accepted the plan;
(B)(i) the plan provides that the holder of such claim retain the lien securing
such claim; and
(ii) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be
distributed under the plan on account of such claim is not less than the
allowed amount of such claim; or
(C) the debtor surrenders the property securing such claim to such holder.
24. Associates Commercial, 117 S. Ct. at 1885.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. The Court noted that application of the replacement value standard to property
retained in exercise of a cram down option "accurately gauges the debtor's use of the
property." Id.
28. Id. at 1886.
29. Associates Commercial, 117 S. Ct. at 1886.
30. Id.
31. Id. The Court reasoned that the Bankruptcy Code neither expressly nor implicitly
authorizes the midpoint valuation approach. Id. According to the Court, valuation must be
1998 459
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maintain uniformity, a basic valuation rule is necessary.32 Thus, the
Supreme Court held that section 506(a) of the Bankruptcy Code
requires the application of the replacement value standard when a
debtor retains and uses the collateral pursuant to the cram down
option provided by section 1325(a)(5)(B). The Fifth Circuit's
judgment was reversed and remanded. 4
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens stated that the
foreclosure value standard is the correct standard.35 He opined that
the first sentence of section 506(a), which refers to "the creditor's
interest in the estate's interest," compels calculation of the
collateral's value from the perspective of the creditor rather than
the debtor or a third party.36 In interpreting the second sentence of
section 506(a), Justice Stevens stated that the purpose of valuation
is to place the creditor in the same position whether the debtor
exercises the cram down option or the creditor repossesses and
forecloses.3 7 Whatever the debtor's choice, Justice Stevens stated,
the creditor receives the present value of the property.38 Justice
Stevens argued that application of the replacement value standard
provides a "general windfall to undersecured creditors at the
expense of unsecured creditors."3 9 Thus, he concluded that use of a
foreclosure value standard promotes consistency throughout the
Bankruptcy Code and avoids higher recoveries by secured creditors
to the detriment of unsecured creditors.
40
Since Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Reform Act 4' in 1978, the
based upon actual, not hypothetical use. Id.
32. Id. The Court noted that the midpoint valuation approach is far more complex
than Congress intended because it would require two separate valuations and calculation of
their average. Id.
33. Id. After stating that the replacement standard governs cram down cases, the
Court noted that "[w]hether replacement value is the equivalent of retail value, wholesale
value or some other value will depend on the type of debtor and the nature of the property."
Id. at n.6.
34. Associates Commercial, 117 S. Ct. at 1887.
35. Id. at 1887 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at n.*. Justice Stevens therefore disagreed with the majority's conclusion that
.surrender and retention are not equivalent acts." Id.
39. Associates Commercial, 117 S. Ct. at 1887 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
40. Id.
41. The first bankruptcy laws were passed by Congress in 1800. BENDER, supra note 3,
1.01[1]. The first bankruptcy act, the 1800 Bankruptcy Act, was enacted to create
uniformity in the law of bankruptcy, but it was repealed in 1803. Id. at 1-3 to -4. After the
enactment and repeal of two intervening Acts, the 1898 Bankruptcy Act was enacted, which
ultimately formed the "basis of modem bankruptcy law." Id. at 1-4 to -5. It was not until
repeal of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act and enactment of the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act that
Vol. 36:455
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valuation standard contemplated by section 506(a), which
determines the secured status of a creditor in a bankruptcy
proceeding, has been interpreted in three ways: the replacement
value standard, the foreclosure value standard, or the midpoint
value standard.
42
In 1980, in In re Crockett," the Bankruptcy Court for the
Northern District of Illinois examined how to value collateral in a
Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding when the debtor chooses to
retain a vehicle that was the subject of a perfected security
interest." The court reasoned that because the creditor's secured
status is measured in reference to the value of the property to the
estate, if the debtor's Chapter 13 plan provides for retention and
use of the property, the debtor may not insist on valuing the
creditor's secured claim at wholesale value." In its analysis, the
court identified retail value and wholesale value as the methods of
valuation proposed by the creditor and debtor, respectively." The
court defined "wholesale value" as auction value; yet, the court
equated the fair market value of the property to its wholesale
value.47 Thus, because neither the creditor nor the debtor requested
a valuation hearing, the court held that it was compelled to use the
wholesale/fair market value as the standard for determining the
creditor's secured status.48
In contrast to the Illinois court in Crockett, the Bankruptcy Court
Congress dramatically changed bankruptcy law. Id. at 1.01[2]. The 1978 Bankruptcy Reform
Act established bankruptcy courts independent of the district courts. Id. at 9 1.01[1]-[2]. The
Supreme Court, however, found the jurisdictional grant unconstitutional because a
bankruptcy court was a non-Article III court and could not be given such jurisdiction. Id. See
also, Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon .Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982). The
Bankruptcy Amendment and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 remedied this problem by
granting Article 1IH district courts jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases and the authority to
refer bankruptcy cases to the bankruptcy courts. BENDER, supra note 3, at 1.02[2]. From
1986 to 1994, the Bankruptcy Code was subjected to frequent amending. Id. at 1 1.0214]-[5].
The 1994 Bankruptcy Reform Act, however, established a Commission to evaluate ways in
which the Bankruptcy Code could be improved. Id. at 1.02[5].
42. Associates Commercial, 117 S. Ct. 1879.
43. 3 B.R. 365 (Bankr. N.D. 111. 1980).
44. Crockett, 3 B.R. at 365. The creditors insist that they are entitled to the retail value
of the vehicle, but the debtors argue that the creditor is only entitled to the amount it would
realize at a foreclosure sale. Id. at 366.
45. Id. at 367. The court noted that the value of the creditor's claim is increased by
the debtor's retention and use of the vehicle, and such increase must be accounted for in the
debtor's plan payments to the secured creditor. Id.
46. Id.




for the Southern District of California in In re Mille 4 9 employed a
different valuation method.5 The parties agreed that the correct
standard of valuation of the collateral was the replacement value
standard.5' The court reasoned that section 506(a) provides a
valuation method based on the use of the property that is an
adaptable standard; and that, in this case, is based on the debtor's
choice to retain the vehicle.52 Although the parties agreed that the
replacement cost was the appropriate standard of valuation, they
disagreed on how the replacement value should be measured.5 The
creditor favored the retail value that it defined as "what a
consumer would pay a dealer."54 The court noted, however, that the
retail cost would include hidden sales costs and dealer profits.o
Favoring the debtor's midpoint approach, the court defined
replacement cost as the "open market value between private
parties," which is the average of the wholesale and retail values.5
Thus, the court held that the creditor was secured to the extent of
the wholesale/retail average.
57
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of
Georgia, confronted with the same issue in In re Reynolds,5 held
that the proper valuation standard, the replacement value, was
measured by the collateral's retail value.5 9 In its determination that
replacement/retail value was the standard to apply, the court noted
that liquidation value, which it defined as wholesale value, would
be "inconsistent with the continued use of the vehicle and the
rehabilitative purpose of this Chapter 13 plan."6° The court found
that the debtors' choice to retain their vehicle increased the value
of the creditor's claim because it facilitated the debtors'
49. 4 B.R. 392 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1980).
50. Miller, 4 B.R. at 392.
51. Id. at 393. The court had to determine how to measure the replacement value. Id.
The creditor argued that the retail price of the car was its replacement value, whereas the





55. Miller, 4 B.R. at 393.
56. Id. at 394. The court recognized that the wholesale value would be significantly
lower because few dealer costs would be incurred. Id. at 393-94. Furthermore, the court
noted that dealings between private parties also would not entail hidden sales costs but
would involve open market conditions that differed from wholesale market conditions. Id.
57. Id. at 394.
58. 17 B.R. 489 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981).
59. Reynolds, 17 BR. at 493.
60. Id.
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rehabilitation. 1 Consequently, the court stated that the debtors'
continued use of the vehicle "connotes a going concern value" and
the court, therefore, held that the replacement/retail value of the
vehicle was the correct valuation standard.
62
In 1989, the United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the
Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of valuation in a Chapter 13 cram
down in In re Malody.6 The court carefully considered the
legislative history of section 506(a).64 The court also recognized the
fact that three valuation standards have been utilized and that no
precise formula exists. In affirming the Bankruptcy Court's
decision, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel reasoned that the
replacement value ignores the risk that the creditor assumed when
it made the loans and permits the creditor to receive more than it
would have if the vehicle were repossessed. 66 The court noted that
the creditor is merely entitled to the amount that a commercially
reasonable sale would generate.67 The facts indicated that a
commercially reasonable sale of the vehicle would yield a
wholesale amount.68 Finally, the court noted that the collateral has
a far greater value in the hands of the debtor than in the creditor's
possession.69 Fear of repossession would ultimately coerce the
debtor into paying the creditor more than it would recover upon
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. 102 B.R. 745 (B.AP. 9th Cir. 1989).
64. Malody, 102 B.R. at 748. The court looked at the Senate report that stated that the
determination of value is to be made on an individual case basis, and that valuation is to be
determined based on the "purpose of the valuation and the proposed disposition or use of
the subject property." Id. at 747 (citing S.Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1978), 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5845). The court also looked at the House Report that states that "value'
does not necessarily contemplate forced sale or liquidation value of the collateral; nor does
it always imply a full going concern value. Courts will have to determine on a case by case
basis, taking into account the facts of each case and the competing interests in the case." Id.
(citing H.R.Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 356 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5787, 5854, 6312).
65. Malody, 102 B.R. 745, 747 (B.A.R 9th Cir. 1989). The creditor asserts that the value
of the vehicle should be based on its retention and use by the debtor, because the debtor
does not have to seek a replacement vehicle. Id. at 748. The debtors assert, however, that
wholesale value should be used because their retention of the vehicle is only "incidental to
their ability to produce income." Id. at 749.
66. Id. at 749.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 750.
69. Id. (citing Cook, 38 B.R. at 873 (quoting H.R. Rep. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 124
(1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6085). The court stressed that collateral may
have a negligible resale value, but still have a substantial replacement value due to the
collateral's consumer and personal nature. Id.
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repossession. 0 Therefore, imposing a replacement value would
inflate the creditor's secured status by measuring the collateral's
value according to the debtor's typically higher cost of
replacement.7
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Idaho
followed the Malody court's reasoning in In re Johnson.7 2 The court
emphasized that no bright line test exists for determiinig secured
status because section 506(a) instructs that valuation must be
measured in light of its purpose and the disposition and use of the
collateral. 73 The court acknowledged that the valuation procedure is
designed to assure that the creditor receives at least the amount it
would receive upon sale of the collateral "in a commercially
reasonable manner."74 Following the teachings of Malody, the court
noted that the replacement value may be the proper valuation tool
in some cases, but may not be in others.75 The court suggested that
the replacement value may be appropriate where the collateral is
instrumental in effecting the reorganization, whereas the wholesale
value may be more suitable if the collateral is nonessential. 76
Therefore, market conditions, as well as the debtor's proposed use
of the collateral, will influence the valuation.77 Although the court
found that the vehicle was not essential to the debtor's
reorganization and although the court followed the reasoning of
Malody, it, nevertheless, found the vehicle's value to be the amount
the creditor would receive upon resale of the vehicle in the present
demanding market, a sum substantially higher than its wholesale
value.
78
In 1990, the Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania confronted the same issue in In re Chapman.7 9 The
court examined whether the debtor's retained vehicle should be
measured by its retail value or its wholesale value.80 Without
70. Malody, 102 B.R. at 750.
71. Id.
72. 117 B.R. 577 (Bankr. Idaho 1990).
73. Johnson, 117 B.R. at 580.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 581 (citing In re Malody, 102 B.R. at 749 (B.A.R 9th Cir. 1989)).
76. Id. at 581.
77. Id.
78. Johnson, 117 B.R. at 581. The court based the valuation on its conclusion that the
vehicle would not be auctioned because of the demand for like vehicles in the retail market.
Id. at 581-82.
79. 135 B.R. 11 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1990).
80. Chapman, 135 B.R. at 11. Both parties referenced the N.AD.A official used car
guide, but the debtor favored the wholesale value and the creditor favored the retail value.
Vol. 36:455
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providing any analysis, the court simply decided that the fairest
value was the average of the retail and wholesale values of the
car.8' The court, however, failed to articulate the equitable factors it
considered to substantiate its application of the midpoint valuation
standard.
82
The decisions of the United States Courts of Appeals on the
valuation of collateral under Chapter 13 are as inconsistent as the
decisions of the United States Bankruptcy Courts. The Ninth
Circuit was the first circuit court to explore the issue in its 1992
decision, In re Mitchell. 3 The court recognized that in the majority
of bankruptcy court decisions, the wholesale value standard was
used.84 The court rejected the creditor's argument that the debtor's
retention of the collateral warrants application of the retail value
standard, because this argument disregards the statute's focus on
the value of the creditor's interest.85 Thus, the court held that the
proper valuation standard is the wholesale value of the collateral,
which is the value of the collateral in the hands of the creditor.
86
The dissent opined, however, that although it is the creditor's
interest that is being measured, that interest must be measured in
light of the debtor's retention and use of the collateral.8 7 The
dissent noted that the debtor certainly will not wholesale the
vehicle and, therefore, application of the wholesale value disregards
the statutory mandate of valuing on the basis of its disposition or
use.88
Upon examining this issue in In re Thimble,8 9 the Eighth Circuit
reached a different conclusion.90 The court recognized that the
cases that applied the foreclosure/wholesale value standard focused
primarily on the first sentence of section 506(a), whereas the cases
Id. at 14.
81. Id. at 14. The court stated, however, that the creditor would likely sell the vehicle
at auction and, therefore, only receive its wholesale value. Id.
82. Id.
83. 954 F2d 557 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled by In re Taffi, 96 F3d 1190 (9th Cir. 1996).
84. Mitchell, 954 F2d at 560. The court also acknowledged that the leading bankruptcy
decision in the Ninth Circuit, Malody, held that the wholesale value should be applied. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. Although the court held that the wholesale value should be applied, it noted
that it does not imply that the debtor's use of the collateral should never be considered. Id.
The court further suggested that if the collateral were instrumental in effecting a
rehabilitation, the replacement value may be appropriate. Id.
87. Id. at 562 (Noonan, C.J., dissenting).
88. Id.
89. 50 F.3d 530 (8th Cir. 1995).
90. Thimble, 50 F.3d at 530.
1998
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that applied the replacement/retail value standard focused on the
second sentence of section 506(a).91 The courts favoring the
wholesale value measured the creditor's interest as a "lien interest"
which is more than a right to sell the collateral after repossession.92
However, the Eighth Circuit stated that the courts favoring the
retail value measured the creditor's interest as the right to receive a
"stream of payments."93 Agreeing with the cases that focused on the
second sentence of section 506(a), the court held that application
of the wholesale valuation standard would wholly disregard the
statutory instruction to value according to disposition and use.
94
The First Circuit's 1995 decision in Winthrop95 was consistent
with the Eighth Circuit's decision in Trimble.96 Specifically, the
First Circuit considered whether the property that a Chapter 11
debtor chooses to retain under his bankruptcy plan must be valued
at its liquidation value or its fair market value.97 In making its
determination, the court recognized that the replacement or fair
market value standard gives effect to the debtor's choice to retain
rather than surrender the collateral, whereas the foreclosure value
standard, which exclusively focuses on the creditor's interest in the
collateral, contemplates a hypothetical disposition.98 By giving
meaning to both sentences, the creditor's secured status is
91. Id. at 531.
92. Id. at 531 (quoting In re Green, 151 .R. 501, 505 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1993)). A "lien" is
a "claim, encumbrance, or charge on property for payment of some debt, obligation or duty."
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 922 (6th ed. 1990).
93. Trimble, 50 F.3d at 531.
94. Id. at 532. The court's decision was based on its opinion that only the
replacement/retail value gives full effect to both the first and second sentences of section
506(a). Id.
95. 50 F3d 72 (1st Cir. 1995).
96. Winthrop, 50 F.3d 72.
97. Id. Chapter 11 offers business debtors the chance to reorganize their businesses
and affords bankruptcy protections to individuals whose debts exceed the Chapter 13 debt
limitations. BENDER, supra note 3, at 1100.01. Chapter 11 enables a debtor to continue
operating its business as a debtor in possession. Id. Therefore, typically a trustee is not
appointed in a Chapter 11 case. Id. Creditors are divided into classes which vote on the
debtor's Chapter 11 plan. Id. at 1100.09[2][d]. If the mandates of Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code are satisfied, the court may confirm the plan over the creditors' objections,
thereby effecting.a Chapter 11 cram down. Id. at 1100.09[2][e].
98. Winthrop, 50 F3d at 75. The court stated that:
By retaining collateral, a Chapter 11 debtor is ensuring that the very event Winthrop
proposes to use to value the property - a foreclosure sale - will not take place. At the
same time, the debtor should not be heard to argue that, in valuing the collateral, the
court should disregard the very event that, according to the debtor's plan, will take
place - namely, the debtor's use of the collateral to generate an income stream.
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measured by the actual use of the collateral rather than an
alternate disposition (surrender and foreclosure) which never
occurs.99 Thus, the court held that the Bankruptcy Court properly
interpreted the statute by valuing the collateral at its fair market
value or replacement value.'00
In 1996, the Ninth Circuit revisited this issue in In re Taffi'01 and
distinguished its 1992 decision in Mitchell. 0 2 On rehearing en banc,
the court addressed the question of which valuation method should
be used to value real property that the debtors choose to retain
under their Chapter 11 plan.' °3 In its analysis, the court noted that a
divided panel of the Ninth Circuit distinguished Mitchell because
Mitchell addressed the valuation standard for a vehicle. 1°4 The court
stressed that wholesale and retail values are both measures of a
vehicle's market value; however, the fair market value of a house
cannot be measured by its foreclosure value due to the depressed
conditions of a foreclosure sale.105 The court, focusing on the
second sentence of section 506(a), held that valuation must be
based on the actual use of the collateral, not on possible or
alternative uses.'06 Consequently, the court held that the proper
valuation standard is the property's fair market value, which is the
"price which a willing seller under no compulsion to sell, and a
willing buyer under no compulsion to buy, would agree upon after
the property has been exposed to the market for a reasonable
time."107 Finally, although the court overruled Mitchell in part, it
refused to address whether wholesale or retail value should be
used to assess a vehicle's fair market value.08
In 1996, the Seventh Circuit encountered the valuation issue in In
re Hoskins,'09 and its analysis of the issue differed from the
99. Id.
100. Id. The court's decision was based on the fact that the debtor proposed to retain
his property for use in producing income. Id. at 76.
101. 96 F3d 1190 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, Taffi v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2478
(1997).
102. Taffi, 96 F3d at 1190.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1192.
105. Id. The court emphasized that the foreclosure value has no application to the
instant case because the debtor was keeping the house and, therefore, no foreclosure sale
would occur. Id.
106. Id.
107. Taffi, 96 F3d at 1192. In defining "fair market value," the court noted that it
cannot be equated to "'replacement value' because the house is not being replaced." Id. The
court did not define or explain how replacement value is measured, however. Id.
108. Id. at 1193.
109. 102 E3d 311 (7th Cir. 1996), overruled by Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash,
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decisions by the other circuit courts.110 In making its decision, the
Seventh Circuit stated that it did not want to favor either the
creditor or the debtor in its final decision."' The court recognized
that the midpoint between the wholesale value and the retail value
would put both parties in a better position than if one of these
valuation methods were preferred.1 2 If retail value were imposed,
the secured creditor would receive a .benefit at the expense of
unsecured creditors because the secured creditor would not have
received retail value if it had foreclosed. 113 If wholesale value were
imposed, the unsecured creditor. would receive the benefit because
the secured creditor would receive a lesser amount, thereby leaving
more funds available for the unsecured creditor than
non-bankruptcy proceedings would yield." 4 Thus, the court held
that when a debtor retains a vehicle that produces income in a
Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan, the average of the foreclosure/
wholesale and replacement/retail values of the collateral must be
used to determine secured status.
115
Similar to the Seventh Circuit, in 1997, the Second Circuit
applied the midpoint valuation standard in In re Valenti."6 Initially,
the court examined the language of section 506(a) and concluded
that if only the first sentence were considered, the wholesale/
liquidation value would apply, but if the second sentence were
considered, the collateral would be valued by its replacement
cost. 1 7 The court rejected retail value as the measure of the
vehicle's replacement value, however, because a vehicle could be
replaced at a price below retail through a private party purchase
rather than a dealer transaction.18 Additionally, the court stated
that application of the retail value disregarded the creditor's
117 S. Ct. 1879 (1997).
110. Hoskins, 102 F.3d at 311.
111. Id. at 313-314. The court recognized "that while the bank would not agree to
forgive or stretch out the loan for less than a package of rights worth as much as the
wholesale price of the car, the Hoskinses would not agree to refinance the loan on the basis
of a value of the car greater than its retail value." Id. at 315-16.
112. Id. at 316. The midpoint standard is based on the inevitable point that both
parties would come to if in a bargaining situation and the goal was to achieve a fair result.
Id.
113. Id. at 317.
114. Id.
115. Hoskins, 102 E3d at 316.
116. 105 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 1997), overruled by Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 117
S. Ct. 1879 (1997).
117. Valenti, 105 F.3d at 61.
118. Id. at 62. The court analogized application of the retail value to reaffirmation of
the debt. Id.
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interest, which is limited to the wholesale value." 9 Noting that the
two operative sentences of section 506(a) suggest conflicting
valuations, the court rejected the application of a fixed value.
120
The court held that "as long as the final valuation of [the] claim
reflects § 506(a)'s dual considerations" of purpose and disposition
or use, section 506(a) is satisfied. 121 Thus, the court affirmed the
district court's application of the midpoint valuation standard
because section 506(a)'s dual considerations were satisfied.122 The
court stressed, however, that neither the midpoint standard nor any
other standard is the fixed method of valuation.
123
Cognizant of the inconsistencies in the appellate courts'
decisions, the Supreme Court of the United States granted
certiorari in Associates Commercial Corporation. 124  In an
eight-to-one decision, the Court decided that it wanted to give full
meaning to both sentences of section 506(a) by applying the
replacement valuation standard. 25 The Court recognized that the
legislature would not have placed the second sentence of section
506(a) in the statute if it were meaningless. 26 Thus, the Court
followed the Ninth Circuit in Taffi,121 the Eighth Circuit in
Thimble,'2 and the First Circuit in Winthrop,129 by choosing the
replacement value standard as the appropriate measure of secured
status. The Supreme Court concluded that the first sentence alone
does not even suggest that the wholesale value applies. It simply
provides that a creditor's claim may be bifurcated into its secured
and unsecured portions. The mere presence of the second sentence
suggests that a recognizable difference exists between surrender
and retention, and that the disposition and use of the collateral
must be accounted for in measuring the value of the creditor's
security.
Although the Supreme Court held that the replacement standard




122. Valenti, 105 F.3d at 63.
123. Id. at 62.
124. Associates Commercial Corp., 117 S. Ct. 1879 (1997).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. 96 F3d 1190 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, Taffi v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2478
(1997).
128. 50 F3d 530 (8th Cir. 1995).
129. 50 F.3d 72 (lst Cir. 1995).
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any bright line test for determining replacement value. Replacement
value, the Court held, is "the price a willing buyer in the debtor's
trade, business or situation would pay a willing seller to obtain
property of like age and condition."130 The Court stated, however,
that it leaves it to the "bankruptcy courts, as triers of facts,
identification of the best way of ascertaining replacement value on
the basis of the evidence presented."131 Thus, the Court's decision
does not resolve the issue, because replacement cost could be
either retail value, wholesale value, fair market value, or any other
value chosen by the courts. By failing to provide a succinct
definition, the Court has authorized the lower courts to determine
replacement value on a case-by-case basis, which may virtually
eliminate the distinction between replacement value and
foreclosure value. This ambiguity will perpetuate the disharmony
among the lower courts' decisions. Although the lower courts must
apply the replacement value standard, they must define that value
in each case. Consequently, cases will arise where a value closer to
the collateral's foreclosure value will be applied. In such cases,
although the courts theoretically will be applying the replacement
value; in practice, they will be using the foreclosure or wholesale
value, thereby rendering the distinction between the two measures
a nullity. Thus, until the legislature decides to change the statute
and provide definitions to remedy this ambiguity, the Supreme
Court's decision will remain an unhelpful tool for resolving the
valuation problem in Chapter 13 cram down cases.
Dawn M. Baumholtz
130. Associates Commercial, 117 S. Ct. at 1884 n.2.
131. Id. at 1886.
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